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PROLOGUE
No one, as recently as two years ago, could have foreseen, even in general out-
line, the nature of the major Canadian constitutional reform now but ten days old.
One cannot but marvel at the hazards and vicissitudes which attend constitution-
making. Indeed, I note, with much relief, that, on August 20, 1787, the American
Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, by a vote of eight states to three,
defeated a proposal to empower the "[l]egislature of the United States" to "make
sumptuary laws."' I count it my great good fortune that Congress cannot restrain
the otherwise limitless bounds of your hospitality. Mr. Mason of Virginia, indeed,
denounced as "a vulgar error" the objection that sumptuary laws "were contrary
to nature;" whilst Mr. Elseworth [sic] of Connecticut presciently replied that "[t]he
best remedy is to enforce taxes and debts. As far as the regulation of eating &
drinking can be reasonable, it is provided for in the power of taxation."'2
Governeur [sic] Morris of Pennsylvania warned that "sump. laws were calculated
to continue great landed estates for ever in the same families-If men had no
temptation to dispose of their money they would not sell their estates."3 North
Carolina, I am pleased to note, was amongst the states opposed to federal sump-
tuary laws.
While it would be churlish even to hint at liquidation of your endowments in
the interests of conviviality, I am sure that, as Mr. Ellsworth would doubtless have
done, we will all see in President Reagan's tax reductions the direction of Amer-
ican public policy, and, as good citizens, be moved accordingly.
I
INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 1982, Canada became, in terms of its own internal law, a sover-
eign state legally independent of the United Kingdom.4 Legal reality was brought
* Of the Bar of the Province of Quebec and the Faculty of Law, McGill University. (The author,
critical of inaccuracies in the American style of citation, has requested specific identification of United
Kingdom statutes and statutes of Great Britain. Other deviations from American style are likewise used at
the author's request.)
1. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 337, 344 (M. Farrand 2d ed. 1937).
2. Id at 344.
3. Id at 351.
4. Canada Act 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), §§ 1 and 2. By its terms, section 2 operates from the coming
into force of the Constitution Act, 1982 (which itself is Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982). Pursuant to
section 58 thereof, the Constitution Act 1982 was (subject to section 59) brought into force by proclamation
of Her Majesty the Queen at Ottawa in a mid-morning ceremony on that date. Set infra note 21
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into accord with an internationally-recognized political reality of at least fifty
years' standing. The intervening decades had been marked by repeated, and
unsuccessful, attempts5 within Canada to devise legal processes to which the
residual sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament might be transferred: in
other words, to define a new sovereign or constituent authority for Canada.
Rehearsal of the history of these attempts--even a very summary rehearsal-
would carry us much too far afield. Suffice it to begin at a rather recent date, and
to recall that, on October 2, 1980, the Government of Canada presented to the
House of Commons of Canada a draft constitutional text 6 having more or less the
scope of (though very different provisions from) the reform which recently became
law. The October 1980 text was proposed as the terms of a joint address by both
Houses of the federal parliament to the Sovereign, praying for the enactment by
the United Kingdom Parliament of a statute which would confer upon Canada
legal independence with a series of constitutional amending processes and a Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms "entrenched" against both the federal par-
liament and the provincial legislatures. It was intended to proceed to Westminster
without the consent of the provincial legislatures or governments.
This scheme immediately encountered opposition and resistance-in most
cases, opposition and resistance of the most sustained and bitter character-from
the opposition parties (the Progressive Conservatives especially) in the federal par-
liament, and from eight of the ten provincial governments: all, that is, save
Ontario and New Brunswick.
A special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons of
Canada was appointed to consider the draft. Its report, 7 tabled in the House of
Commons on February 13, 1981, proposed a variety of changes. Although various
compromises had succeeded in securing the (rather unenthusiastic) concurrence of
the federal New Democratic Party, and of most of its M.P.'s, the revised draft was
met with nearly the same obstruction in the House as its predecessor, and no less
opposition from the provinces. Only on April 8, 1981-with no end to the debate
in sight-was all-party agreement on procedure announced in the House of Com-
mons.8 Under this agreement a special order was unanimously adopted, fixing a
timetable for the disposition of all amendments to the text reported from the Com-
mittee, and, ultimately, for the disposition of the final text as it might be amended.
This agreement, however, committed the government to await the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada on pending appeals from decisions of the Manitoba, the
Newfoundland, and the Quebec Courts of Appeal on questions referred to them by
the governments of these provinces, both as to the constitutional propriety and the
5. See, e.g., the accounts in P. GRIN-LAJOIE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA (1950), and
Editor's DTaty, introducing a symposium in 12 McGILL L.J. 337 (1966-67).
6. Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the Constitution of Canada
(October 2, 1980), Government of Canada, document number 25005-2-10-80.
7. Canada, House of Commons, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, Friday, February 13, 1981, being 32nd
Parliament, 1st Session, No. 142, at 1244 ff.
8. Canada, House of Commons, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, Wednesday, April 8, 1981, being 32nd
Parliament, 1st Session, No. 179, at 1677 ff. See also 8 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 9072 ff. (Apr. 8,
1981).
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legal validity or consequences of the course of action upon which the federal
Houses had embarked.
The Supreme Court of Canada's majority decision of September 28, 1981, 9
held that, as a matter of law, the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament
survived intact and unimpaired; that is, it could validly and effectively legislate on
the Canadian constitution, either on its own motion or in response to any request
of its choosing. But the Court also held that (extra-legal) "conventions" existed
rendering constitutionally improper a federal parliamentary approach to the Impe-
rial Parliament without a sufficient provincial consensus; and that, whatever the
"necessary" consensus might be, the two provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick
did not suffice.' 0
Even if it had remained politically possible for federal parliamentary majorities
to force the measure as it then stood (with amendments approved by the House of
Commons on April 23, 1981,"1 and by the Senate on April 24, 198112) through
both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, it was doubtful that the Government of
the United Kingdom would (even, perhaps, that it could) carry a bill in the terms
requested through the Parliament at Westminster.
A negotiated solution became the only alternative. This was achieved on
November 5, 1981,13 the signatories being the governments of Canada and of all
provinces save Quebec. The agreed scheme was based largely on an earlier inter-
provincial agreement of April 16, 1981 (the "April Accord") amongst the eight
"opposing" provincial governments. In particular, the federal-provincial agree-
ment of November 5, 1981, introduced the "legislative override" (reflected in sec-
tion 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982)14 allowing the Parliament of Canada and
the provincial legislatures to override, by express statutory language, most of the
guarantees of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It also adopted from
the "April Accord" a scheme of constitutional amending formulae which Prime
Minister Trudeau had repeatedly denounced as tending to create a "chequerboard
Canada." These amending procedures had, and have, almost no resemblance on
essential points to the federal proposals which they displaced.
The Minister of Justice of Canada, by notice of motion of November 18, 1981,
9. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 & 3) 125 D.L.R.3d 1, 41 (Can.
1981).
10. Id at 103.
11. Canada, House of Commons, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, Thursday, April 23, 1981, being 32nd
Parliament, 1st Session, No. 187, at 1741 ff.
12. Canada, MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, Friday, April 24, 1981, being 32nd Parlia-
ment, 1st Session, No. 117, at 1150 ff. The proposals, as they then stood, are most conveniently read in a
consolidation printed by the Department of Justice of Canada, TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
RESOLUTION FILED BY THE DEPUTY ATrORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA WITH THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA ON APRIL 24, 1981, document number 25005-24-4-81.
13. The (unpublished) document recording the agreement was tabled by the Prime Minister in the
House of Commons on November 5, 1981; see HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES for that date, at 12536 ff.,
and in particular the Prime Minister's statement.
14. The Constitution Act, 1982, is Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, 1982 ch. 11, the United
Kingdom statute enacted on March 29, 1982, to give effect to the request of the Senate and House of
Commons of Canada that the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982, be enacted. See text accompanying
notes 21-28 infta.
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accordingly introduced into the House of Commons a resolution 15 for a joint
address to the Sovereign conforming to the federal-provincial agreement.
Although changes had been made in order to accommodate positions adopted by
the Government of Quebec, it proved impossible to secure the province's agree-
ment to the project. Quebec has remained steadfastly and intransigently opposed
to the ultimate Canada Act and has not accepted the issue as settled politically.
On December 2, 1981, the House of Commons of Canada,16 and, on December
8, 1981, the Senate of Canada 17 adopted the final text of what has now become the
Canada Act, 1982-the ultimate exercise of Imperial legislative authority for
Canada.
II
"PATRIATION"
[Tihe King's Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons of Great Bitain . . .had, hath, and of Right ought to have, full
Power and Authority to make Laws ... of sufficient Force and Validity to bind the Colo-
nies and People of America, Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all Cases whatsoever. 'a
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution,
and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his Assent to their acts of pretended Legislation:
.... For . .. declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all cases
whatsoever. 19
The British Parliament's statutory challenge in the "Declaratory Act" of 1766
drew from the inhabitants of the North American "thirteen colonies" their formal
response in the Declaration of Independence ten years later. For them, Imperial
legislative supremacy was ended by war: its end was consecrated by treaty20 in
1783.
On April 17, 1982, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, in a mid-morning cere-
mony at Ottawa, proclaimed 2' into force the Canada Act 198222 (with its sched-
15. The text, standing in the name of the Minister of Justice and dated November 18, 1981, may be
found under "Government Notices of Motions" at xiv ff. of the "Notice Paper" appended to Canadian
House of Commons ORDER PAPER AND NOTIcEs, Thursday, November 19, 1981, being 32nd Parliament,
1st Session, No. 259.
16. Canada, House of Commons, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, Wednesday, December 2, 1981, being
32nd Parliament, 1st Session, No. 268, at 4304 ff. The final text, incorporating amendments, appears at
4308 ff., and is separately printed under the title TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION RESPECTING THE CONSTrru-
TION OF CANADA ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON DECEMBER 2, 1981, document number
25005-2-12-81.
17. Canada, MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, Tuesday, December 8, 1981, being 32nd
Parliament, 1st Session, No. 162, at 1722 ff. The final text, incorporating amendments, and approved on
division, appears at 1759 ff.
18. An Act for the better securing the Dependency of Her Majesty's Dominions in Amer'ca upon the
Crown and Parliament of Great Britain (American Colonies Act), 1766, 6 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (G.B.).
The American Colonies Act of 1766 long survived the particular historical circumstances which had
induced its passage, standing on the British statute book until its repeal by the Statute Law Revision Act,
1964, 1964 ch. 79 (U.K.), which collectively declared a number of acts to be "obsolete, spent or unnecessary
or . . .superseded by other enactments." Id at § 1.
19. The Declaration of Independence, paras. 15, 24 (U.S. 1776).
20. Treaty of Versailles, Jan. 20, 1783, 8 Stat. 58, T.I.A.S. No. 103, at 6.
21. Can. Gaz. Extra No. 20 (April 17, 1982), 116 Can. Gaz. Part I 2927-28 (1982); see also Canada Act
1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.).
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uled Constitution Act, 1982), to which Her Majesty had assented in the United
Kingdom Parliament on March 29, 1982. With effect from the beginning of the
day of Proclamation, 23 the overriding legislative sovereignty of the United
Kingdom Parliament-declared for the Empire generally in the Colonial Laws
Validity Act, 1865,24 and effectually preserved for Canada by section 7 of the
Statute of Westminster, 193125- came to an end for us. The Canada Act 1982,26
with its Schedule B, the Constitution Act, 1982,27 substituted for the "Imperial"
legislative authority of the United Kingdom Parliament (and for certain existing
"domestic" constitutional amendment processes28 of rather limited scope) the pro-
cedures which this paper will examine. These procedures are found in Part V of
the Constitution Act, 1982, entitled "Procedure for Amending Constitution of
Canada."
22. Id
23. Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63 (U.K.), § 36(2); see also Regina v. Logan, [1957] 2
Q.B. 589, 590-91.
As to the operation of section 58 of the Constitution Act, 1982, providing that for most purposes the Act
would come into force on a day to be fixed by proclamation of the Queen or the Governor General under
the Great Seal of Canada, see Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63 (U.K.), § 37.
24. 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63 (U.K.). Section 2 of the Act provides:
Any Colonial Law which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the Provisions of any Act of
Parliament extending to the Colony to which such Law may relate, or repugnant to any Order or
Regulation made under the Authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in the Colony the Force
and Effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act, Order, or Regulation, and shall, to the extent
of such Repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative.
Section 1 provides, "An Act of Parliament, or any Provision thereof, shall, in construing this Act, be said to
extend to any Colony when it is made applicable to such Colony by the express Words or necessary Intend-
ment of any Act of Parliament. ... "
25. 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (U.K.). Sections 2 and 7(3) of the Statute empowered the Parliament of Canada,
within the scope of its legislative authority, to enact laws repugnant to Imperial legislation extending to
Canada. (Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Statute placed the provincial legislatures in the same position.)
Conversely, section 4 of the same Statute barred extension "to a Dominion" (defined by section 1 to
include Canada) of any future United Kingdom statute "unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that
Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof."
The whole Statute, however, was subject to section 7(1), which provided that "[n]othing in this Act
shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to
1930, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder." This clause effectively saved an unrestricted
power to exercise lawmaking authority in Canada. It left Canadian constituent power in the hands of the
United Kingdom Parliament. See generally Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos.
1, 2 & 3), 125 D.L.R. 3d 1 (Can. 1981); Scott, Opinion Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons of the United Kingdom on the Role of the United Kingdom Parliament in Relation to
the [BNA] Acts, repnntedin 26 MCGILL LJ. 614, 615-18 (1981).
26. 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), §§ 1-2.
27. §§ 52, 53(1) and Schedule Items 1, 17, 22. Together, these provisions repeal sections 4 and 7(1) of
the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (U.K.) (see supra note 25), as well as sections 91.1 and
92.1 of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), as amended by the British North
America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.). (The Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982,
also renames the British North America Act, 1867, as amended by the 1982 Act's Schedule, Item 1, the
"Constitution Act, 1867." Hereinafter, the original name will be used unless the 1867 Act is being alluded
to in its current form.)
28. British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.) (amending §§ 91.1 and
92.1 of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.)).
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III
"THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA" AND "THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE"
Anglo-Canadian public law is deeply legitimist, placing a great weight on strict
legal continuity. Law may be made according to law, and not otherwise: that is,
by the persons, and according to the processes, prescribed by law. Failure to
comply with conditions of manner and form of lawmaking, if these be not merely
directory, results in the radical nullity of the purported enactment. This approach
probably results from the notion that lawmaking power-indeed public authority
generally-is to be derived from the law itself, rather than from the people. The
Constitution Act, 1982, represents no departure from this legitimist tradition.
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, is entitled "Procedure for Amending
Constitution of Canada." Section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (not found
in Part V at all, but rather in "Part VII General"), imposes a condition upon the
validity of amendments by providing that "[a]mendments to the Constitution of
Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the
Constitution of Canada." This, in a sense, is a corollary of section 52(1), which
provides that "[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent
of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
The terms "Constitution of Canada" and "constitution of the province"
appear in the various formulae of Part V. If a proposed enactment would amend
the one or the other "constitution," section 52(3) requires that its passage must be
accomplished in virtue of "the Constitution of Canada." While this is, of course,
true of the making of a/ laws, it is clear from the language of section 52(3) and
Part V that, in most if not all cases, recourse to the procedures of Part V is neces-
sary where an amendment to either "the Constitution of Canada" or "the constitu-
tion of the province" is involved.
Thus, definition of these two classes of amendment is pertinent to the identifi-
cation of the subject-matter to which the various procedures of Part V are
addressed, and therefore to the identification of the cases where a given procedure
must be employed.
At the same time, the term "Constitution of Canada" is broader than merely
"Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982." Section 52(3) leaves open the possibility
that pre-existing rules of law admittedly forming part of the "Constitution of
Canada" may be altered by processes outside the confines of Part V; and this is so,
even though that Part gives the general appearance of an exhaustive scheme.29
29. For example, it may be that despite the provisions of sections 42(1)(e) and 43 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, section 3 of the Constitution Act, 1871, retains at least a limited operation:
The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the consent of the Legislature of any Province
of the said Dominion, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of such Province, upon such
terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the said Legislature, and may, with the like consent,
make provision respecting the effect and operation of any such increase or diminution or alteration of
territory in relation to any Province affected thereby,
[Vol. 45: No. 4
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What, then, is "the Constitution of Canada"? Section 52(2) (with which, for
the sake of convenience, is reproduced section 53(1)) gives only partial guidance:
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes
(a) the Canada Act, 1982, including this Act;
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).
53. (1) The enactments referred to in Column I of the schedule are hereby repealed or
amended to the extent indicated in Column II thereof and, unless repealed, shall continue
as law in Canada under the names set out in Column III thereof.
Section 52(2) gives only partial guidance because, by employing the term
"includes" in preference to the word "means," the definition does not purport to
be exhaustive.
The list in the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, begins with The British
North America Act, 1867, and continues with various direct and other amend-
ments made by federal 30 and Imperial statutes. The Statute of Westminster, 1931,
appears in the list, as do the Imperial Orders-in-Council and federal statutes cre-
ating new provinces. Many statutory enactments not enumerated in the schedule,
and many common-law rules,3' are, however, inherently quite as "constitutional"
in nature as those instruments which are so enumerated.
For example, much of the "organic" law dealing with the constitution and
structure of the federal parliament is to be found on the federal statute book.32
Are these enactments parts of the "Constitution of Canada"? Consider, for
instance, the existing rules making a seat in any house of a provincial legislature
incompatible with a seat in the House of Commons. Putting aside provincial statu-
tory provisions, few lawyers could, from memory, venture to say with confidence
where these rules are to be found, just as few could indicate the source of the rule
making a seat in the Senate of Canada incompatible with a seat in the House of
Commons. The answer, of course, is that the former are to be found in the House
of Commons Act,33 whilst the latter is in the Act of 1867. 34 They seem equally
"constitutional" in their nature; and, since 1949, they would seem to have stood on
an equal footing as regards Parliament's power to amend them unilaterally.3 5 Yet
Constitution Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 28 (U.K.), § 3 (originally the British North America Act, 1871;
renamed in Item 5 of the Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982).
Section 42(i)(e) provides that an amendment to the Constitution of Canada extending existing prov-
inces to the territories must be made in accordance with the "general procedure" of section 38(i). Ste infa
Part V.
Section 43 furnishes a "special arrangements" procedure whereby certain amendments pertaining to
one or more, but not all, provinces may be made. See also infra Part VII.
30. In virtue of section 91.1 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as amended (see supra note 27), and the
Constitution Act, 1871, as amended (see supra note 29).
31. In Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada Act (Nos. 1, 2 & 3), 125 D.L.R.3d I
(Can. 1981), the majority held that "part of the Constitution of Canada consists of the rules of the common
law." Id at 81. Examples follow in their Lordships' reasons. Id at 82.
32. See, e.g., House of Commons Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. H-9 (1970); Senate and House of Com-
mons Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. S-8 (1970); Speaker of the House of Commons Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch.
S-13 (1970); Speaker of the Senate Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. S-14 (1970).
33. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. H-9, §§ 2-5 (1970).
34. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 39.
35. See British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.), §§ 1-2; Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), Sch. B § 44.
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the relevant provisions of the House of Commons Act long antedate Parliament's
acquisition in 1949 of nominate powers to amend parts of the "Constitution of
Canada.'3 6 It was doubtless (and, in my view, quite correctly) assumed that Par-
liament, from the birth of the federation in 1867, had legislative authority to enact
such provisions, and this probably in virtue of its "residuary" authority (although
section 41 of the 1867 Act 3 7 may confer a relevant power). Indeed, in upholding
the constitutional validity of the federal Official Languages Act, 3  Chief Justice
Laskin, speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada, held as follows in Jones v.
Attorney-General of Canada:
Apart from the effect of s. 133 and s. 91(1), to be considered later in these reasons, I am
in no doubt that it was open to the Parliament of Canada to enact the Ojiaal Languages Act
(limited as it is to the purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada and to the
institutions of that Parliament and Government) as being a law "for the. peace, order and
good Government of Canada in relation to [a matter] not coming within the Classes of
Subjects. . .assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces". The quoted words
are in the opening paragraph of s. 91 of the Britirh NortA America Act, 1867; and, in relying
on them as constitutional support for the Offwtal Languages Act, I do so on the basis of the
purely residuary character of the legislative power thereby conferred. No authority need be
cited for the exclusive power of the Parliament of Canada to legislate in relation to the
operation and administration of the institutions and agencies of the Parliament and Gov-
ernment of Canada. Those institutions and agencies are clearly beyond provincial reach. 39
Now, under section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the rule making a seat
in the Senate incompatible with a seat in the House of Commons is part of the
"Constitution of Canada" since it is found in the Act of 1867, one of the enact-
ments enumerated in the schedule. By contrast, the status of the federal statutory
incompatibility of membership in a provincial legislative body with membership
in the Commons of Canada cannot be determined with the same certainty.
Probably, in this particular instance, it does not much matter. For, if the rele-
vant provisions of the House of Commons Act do form part of the "Constitution of
Canada," they can be altered by simple federal statute in virtue of section 44 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, and, possibly, also in virtue of the "residuary power" of
Parliament. If they do not form part of the "Constitution of Canada," the federal
"residuary" legislative power seems certainly available.
However, a decision that a proposed enactment would, or would not, if it
became law, amend "the Constitution of Canada" (or "the constitution of the
province") would, in some cases, have important consequences. Some rules of law
dealing with the executive government, or the legislative institutions, of Canada or
of a province may concern (for example) "the office of the Queen, the Governor
General and the Lieutenant Governor of a province." If they form part of the
"Constitution of Canada," these will, under section 41(a), be amendable only
through a proclamation issued by the Governor General of Canada with the
authorization of resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons (or of the Com-
36. ee British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.) (adding a sweeping
new section 91.1 to the 1867 Act).
37. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 41.
38. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 0-2 (1970).
39. Jones v. Attomey-Gen. of Canada, 45 D.L.R.3d 583, 588-89 (Can. 1981).
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mons alone under section 47(1)) and of the legislative assembly of eveY province.
The common law, "received English" statute law, and "Imperial" statute law on
the succession to the Crown afford a good illustrative example. If they are part of
the "Constitution of Canada," section 41 (a) appears to apply. Otherwise, the fed-
eral "residuary" power appears to be available, enabling unilateral legislation.
Again, if section 4 of the Senate and House of Commons Act 40 (enacted under
the authority of what is now4 ' section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867) governing
the privileges, immunities, and powers of the Senate and House of Commons and
their members, forms part of "the Constitution of Canada," it becomes necessary
to consider the relative scope of sections 44 (empowering the federal parliament,
subject inter alia to section 42, to "make law amending the Constitution of
Canada in relation to . . .the Senate") and 42(l)(b) (providing that an "amend-
ment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to" inter alia "(b) the powers of the
Senate..." may be enacted only in accordance with the procedures prescribed in
section 38(1)) of the Constitution Act, 1982). The two sections differ radically.
These may seem, to anyone save a specialist in Canadian public law, to be
rather arcane illustrations. So I shall conclude this part of my discussion with a
matter of obviously great importance-the constitutional position of the Supreme
Court of Canada, which is the "General Court of Appeal for Canada" created by
the Parliament of Canada pursuant to the Act of 1867. Section 101 of the Act of
1867 provides, "The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this
Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organi-
zation of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any
additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada. '42
Whether the whole or any part of this plenary authority of Parliament to legis-
late as to the Supreme Court of Canada has survived the Constitution Act, 1982, is
less than clear on the face of the latter act. The procedures for amending "the
Constitution of Canada" as to matters pertaining to the Court, as these procedures
are set out in the Constitution Act, 1982, are far more arduous than the unilateral
federal power contemplated by the drafters of the Act of 1867. Under section 41 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, an "amendment to the Constitution of Canada in rela-
tion to. . .(d) the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada" requires a proc-
lamation by the Governor General authorized by the Senate and House of
Commons---or by the Commons alone under section 47(1)-and by the legislative
40. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. S-8 (1970).
The Senate and the House of Commons respectively, and the members thereof respectively, hold,
enjoy and exercise,
(a) such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, at the time of the passing of the Brtish
NorM 4merica Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the
United Kingdom, and by the members thereof, so far as the same are consistent with and not repug-
nant to that Act; and
(b) such privileges, immunities and powers as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada, not exceeding those at the time of the passing of such Act held, enjoyed and exercised
by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof
respectively.
41. The original section 18 of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), was
repealed and replaced by the Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 38 (U.K.), § I.
42. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 101.
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assembly of evey province. Under section 42(1), an "amendment to the Constitu-
tion of Canada in relation to . . . (d) subject to paragraph 41(d), the Supreme
Court of Canada" requires a proclamation by the Governor General authorized
by the Senate and House of Commons-or by the Commons alone under section
47(l)-and resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the prov-
inces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then-latest general census, at
least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces.
It is beyond discussion that, prior to the commencement of the Constitution
Act, 1982, the Parliament of Canada, under section 101 of the Act of 1867, had
legislative authority to make, by simple federal statute, whatever provision it
might have thought fit as to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, its
jurisdiction, or any other aspect of its existence. 43 The Constitution Act, 1982,
does not purport, in express terms, to repeal section 101 of the 1867 Act, whether
in whole or in part. Indeed, the former Act's section 53(1), read with the schedule,
expressly continues the whole Act of 1867 in force, with exceptions not now
material.
The Parliament of Canada has, of course, provided for the constitution and
organization of the Supreme Court of Canada. Most of its legislation on the sub-
ject is to be found in the Supreme Court Act, 44 some of the most important provi-
43. See, e.g., Attorney-Gen. of Ontario v. Attorney-Gen. of Canada, 1947 A.C. 127 (P.C.); Crown
Grain Co. v. Day, 1908 A.C. 504, 506 (P.C.).
44. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. S-19 (1970).
THE COURT
3. The court of common law and equity in and for Canada now existing under the name of the
Supreme Court of Canada is hereby continued under that name, as a general court of appeal for
Canada, and as an additional court for the better administration of the laws of Canada, and shall
continue to be a court of record.
THE JUDGES
4. The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice to be called the Chief Justice of Canada, and
eight puisne judges, who shall be appointed by the Governor in Council by letters patent under the
Great Seal.
5. Any person may be appointed a judge who is or has been a judge of a superior court of any of the
provinces of Canada, or a barrister or advocate of at least ten years standing at the bar of any of the
provinces.
6. At least three of the judges shall be appointed from among the judges of the Court of Appeal, or of
the Superior Court, or the barristers or advocates of the Province of Quebec.
7. No judge shall hold any other office of emolument either under the Government of Canada or
under the government of any province of Canada.
8. The judges shall reside in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National
Capital Act or within twenty-five miles thereof.
9. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the judges hold office during good behaviour, but are removable by
the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons.
(2) A judge ceases to hold office upon attaining the age of seventy-five years.
SESSIONS AND QUORUM
25. Any five of the judges of the Supreme Court shall constitute a quorum and may lawfully hold
the Court.
26. It is not necessary for all the judges who have heard the argument in any case to be present in
order to constitute the Court for delivery of judgment in that case, but in the absence of any judge,
from illness or any other cause, judgment may be delivered by a majority of the judges who were
present at the hearing.
27. (1) Any judge who has heard the case and is absent at the delivery of judgment, may hand his
opinion in writing to any judge present at the delivery of judgment, to be read or announced in
open court, and then to be left with the Registrar or reporter of the Court.
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sions of which are set out below. Other provisions pertaining to the Court are to
(2) A judge who has resigned his office, or who has ceased to hold office under section 9 shall,
within six months thereafter, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be absent at the
delivery of judgment in any case heard by him in which judgment has not been delivered during
his tenure of office.
28. (1) No judge against whose judgment an appeal is brought, or who took part in the trial of the
cause or matter, or in the hearing in a court below, shall sit or take part in the hearing of or
adjudication upon the proceedings in the Supreme Court.
(2) In any cause or matter in which a judge is unable to sit or take part in consequence of this
section, any four of the other judges of the Supreme Court constitute a quorum and may lawfully
hold the Court.
29. Any four judges constitute a quorum and may lawfully hold the Court in cases where the parties
consent to be heard before a court so composed.
30. (1) Where at any time there is not a quorum of the judges of the Supreme Court available to
hold or continue any session of the Court, owing to a vacancy or vacancies, or to the absence
through illness or on leave or in the discharge of other duties assigned by statute or order in
council, or to the disqualification of a judge or judges, the Chief Justice, or, in his absence, the
senior puisne judge, may in writing request the attendance at the sittings of the Court, as an ad
hoc judge, for such period as may be necessary, of a judge of the Federal Court, or, should the
judges of that court be absent from Ottawa or for any reason unable to sit, of a judge of a
provincial superior court to be designated in writing by the Chief Justice or in his absence by any
acting chief justice or the senior puisne judge of such provincial court upon such request being
made to him in writing.
(2) Unless two of the judges of the Supreme Court available fulfil the requirements of section 6,
the ad hoc judge for the hearing of an appeal from a judgment rendered in the Province of
Quebec shall be a judge of the Court of Appeal or a judge of the Superior Court of that Province
designated as above provided.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
35. The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise an appellate, civil and criminal jurisdiction
within and throughout Canada.
41. (1) Subject to subsection (3), an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final or other judg-
ment of the highest court of final resort in a province, or a judge thereof, in which judgment can
be had in the particular case sought to be appealed to the Supreme Court, whether or not leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court has been refused by any other court, where, with respect to the
particular case sought to be appealed, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that any question
involved therein is, by reason of its public importance or the importance of any issue of law or
any issue of mixed law and fact involved in such question, one that ought to be decided by the
Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or significance as to warrant decision
by it, and leave to appeal from such judgment is accordingly granted by the Supreme Court.
(2) Leave to appeal under this section may be granted during the period fixed by section 64 or
within thirty days thereafter or within such further extended time as the Supreme Court or a
judge may either before or after the expiry of the thirty days fix or allow.
(3) No appeal to the Supreme Court lies under this section from the judgment of any court
acquitting or convicting or setting aside or affirming a conviction or acquittal of an indictable
offence or, except in respect of a question of law or jurisdiction, of an offence other than an
indictable offence.
(4) Whenever the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal, the Supreme Court or a judge
may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, extend the time within which the appeal may be
allowed.
42. Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction as provided in any
other Act conferring jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE
54. (1) The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise exclusive ultimate appellate civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction within and for Canada; and the judgment of the Court is, in all cases, final and
conclusive.
(2) Notwithstanding any royal prerogative or anything contained in any Act of the Parliament
of the United Kingdom or any Act of the Parliament of Canada or any Act of the legislature of
any province of Canada or any other statute or law, no appeal lies or shall be brought from or in
respect of the judgment of any court, judge or judicial officer in Canada to any court of appeal,
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be found in the Rules4 5 made under the Act, and in other statutes, numbering
perhaps two dozen, such as the Bankruptcy Act 46 and the Criminal Code,47 which
latter includes the sections on Supreme Court jurisdiction also set out below.4 8
tribunal or authority by which, in the United Kingdom, appeals or petitions to Her Majesty in
Council may be ordered to be heard.
(3) TheJudicial Committee Act, 1833, chapter 41 of the statutes of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, 1833, and Thejuaicial Committee Act, 1844, chapter 69 of the statutes of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 1844, and all orders, rules or regulations made
under those Acts are repealed in so far as they are part of the law of Canada.
SPECIAL JURISDICTION
References by Governor tn Council
55. (1) Important questions of law or fact concerning
(a) the interpretation of the Bntish North America Acts,"
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or provincial legislation;
(c) the appellate jurisdiction as to educational matters, by the British North America Act, 1867,
or by any other Act or law vested in the Governor in Council;
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures of the provinces, or of the
respective governments thereof, whether or not the particular power in question has been or
is proposed to be exercised; or
(e) any other matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court gusden genern) with the
foregoing enumerations, with reference to which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit
any such question;
may be refirred by the Governor in Council to the Supreme Court for hearing and considera-
tion; and any question concerning any of the matters aforesaid, so referred by the Governor in
Council, shall be conclusively deemed to be an important question.
(2) Where a reference is made to the Court under subsection (1) it is the duty of the Court to
hear and consider it, and to answer each question so referred; and the Court shall certify to the
Governor in Council, for his information, its opinion upon each such question, with the reasons
for each answer; and the opinion shall be pronounced in like manner as in the case of a judgment
upon an appeal to the Court; and any judge who differs from the opinion of the majority shall in
like manner certify his opinion and his reasons.
(3) Where the question relates to the constitutional validity of any Act that has heretofore been
or is hereafter passed by the legislature of any province, or of any provision in any such Act, or in
case, for any reason, the government of any province has any special interest in any such ques-
tion, the attorney general of the province shall be notified of the hearing, in order that he may be
heard if he thinks fit.
(4) The Court has power to direct that any person interested, or, where there is a class of persons
interested, any one or more persons as representatives of such class, shall be notified of the
hearing upon any reference under this section, and such persons are entitled to be heard thereon.
(5) The Court may, in its discretion, request any counsel to argue the case as to any interest that
is affected and as to which counsel does not appear, and the reasonable expenses thereby occa-
sioned may be paid by the Minister of Finance out of any moneys appropriated by Parliament
for expenses of litigation.
References by Senate or House of Commons
56. The Court, or any two of the judges thereof, shall examine and report upon any private bill or
petition for a private bill presented to the Senate or House of Commons, and referred to the Court
under any rules or orders made by the Senate or House of Commons.
45. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, CON. REG. CAN., ch. 1512 (1978). (New Rules of the
Supreme Court of Canada, made on Jan. 11, 1983, will be valid only so far as consistent with the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982. See SOR/82-74, 117 Can. Gaz. 380 (1983).)
46. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. B-3, §§ 164-67 (1970).
47. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. C-34 (1970).
48. 618. (1) A person who is convicted of an indictable offence and whose conviction is affirmed
by the court of appeal may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
(a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents, or
(b) on any question of law, if leave to appeal is granted by the Supreme Court of
Canada within twenty-one days after the judgment appealed from is pronounced or
within such extended time as the Supreme Court of Canada or a judge thereof may,
for special reasons, allow.
(2) A person
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It is important to note that none of these statutory provisions-not those in the
Supreme Court Act nor those in the Criminal Code-are enumerated as part of the
"Constitution of Canada" in the schedule of the Constitution Act, 1982. Yet sec-
tion 53(1) of the latter Act, as shown above, does not make that enumeration
exhaustive. If, and to the extent that, any or all of the provisions in question are
part of the "Constitution of Canada," they can, clearly, be altered only in compli-
ance with the elaborate formulae prescribed in sections 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, in the cases of sections 6 and 30(2) of the Supreme
Court Act, concerning judges from Quebec, 49 quoted earlier, it is at least arguable
that section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982, applies prima facie; if so, there arise
difficult questions as to the nature of section 43 and its relationship to the other
procedures-both generally and in the specific matter of the Supreme Court of
Canada. Would repeal of section 6 of the Supreme Court Act be possible: (i) by
unilateral federal statute under section 101 of the Act of 1867? (ii) by the proce-
dure prescribed by section 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982? (iii) by the pro-
cedure prescribed by section 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982? (iv) by the
procedure prescribed by section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982?
To argue that none of the federal statute law dealing with the Supreme Court of
Canada forms part of the "Constitution of Canada" is to say, in effect, that Parlia-
ment may continue to legislate on the subject exactly as it pleases; and that its
power under section 101 of the 1867 Act to do so cannot be taken away save by the
elaborate methods newly prescribed by Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. This
can scarcely have been what the eight "opposing" premiers had in mind when
they signed their "April Accord" 50 from which sections 41(d) and 42(l)(d) were
taken. Yet this construction is not, on its face, an impossible one.
On the other hand, if all federal statute law on the subject of the Supreme
Court of Canada forms part of the "Constitution of Canada," it is not obvious why
amendment of any of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada is not equally
subject to the procedure prescribed by section 42(l)(d) of the Constitution Act,
(a) who is acquitted of an indictable offence other than by reason of the special
verdict of not guilty on account of insanity and whose acquittal is set aside by the
court of appeal, or
(b) who is tried jointly with a person referred to in paragraph (a) and is convicted
and whose conviction is sustained by the court of appeal, may appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada on a question of law.
620. (1) A person who has been found not guilty on account of insanity and
(a) whose acquittal is affirmed on that ground by the court of appeal, or
(b) against whom a verdict of guilty is entered by the court of appeal under subpar-
agraph 613(4)(b)(i), may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
(2) A person who is found unfit, on account of insanity, to stand his trial and against
whom that verdict is affirmed by the court of appeal may appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
(3) An appeal under subsection (1) or (2) may be
(a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents, or
(b) on any question of law, if leave to appeal is granted by the Supreme Court of
Canada within twenty-one days after the judgment appealed from is pronounced or
within such extended time as the Supreme Court of Canada or a judge thereof may,
for special reasons, allow.
See supra note 44.
49. See supra note 44.
50. See supra note 13.
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1982. One such rule provides, "The covers of the appellants' factum shall be col-
oured buff and the covers of the respondents' factum shall be coloured green."' 5 '
Such a position would be tantamount to holding that sections 41(d) and 42(1)(d)
of the Constitution Act, 1982, have impliedly repealed so much of section 101 of
the Act of 1867 as concerns the "General Court of Appeal for Canada." The rule
of statutory construction pertaining to implied repeal was perhaps best stated by
Rt. Hon. Dr. Lushington in The India (No. 2):
What words will constitute a repeal by implication it is impossible to say from authority
or decided cases. If, on the one hand, the general presumption must be against such a
repeal, on the ground that the intention to repeal, if any had existed, would have been
declared in express terms; so on the other, it is not necessary that any express reference be
made to the statute which is to be repealed. The prior statute would I conceive be repealed
by implication, if its provisions were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one, or, if the
two statutes together would lead to wholly absurd consequences, or if the entire subject-
matter were taken away by the subsequent statute. Perhaps the most difficult case for
consideration is where the subject-matter has been so dealt with in subsequent statutes,
that, according to all ordinary reasoning, the particular provision in the prior statute would
not have been intended to subsist, and yet if it were left subsisting no palpable absurdity
would be occasioned.
5 2
The Supreme Court of Canada will likely be disposed to adopt an intermediate
position, attributing to some of the federal statutory provisions a "constitutional"
character, and to others not. This would give an entrenched status to the essential
elements of the court's character, without involving the inconvenience which an
implied repeal of the pertinent portion of section 101 would entail. On the other
hand, it would show very clearly just how uncertain in law is the phrase "the
Constitution of Canada" as it appears in Part V of the 1982 Act.
The phrase "the constitution of the province" appears in section 45 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1982, which provides that, subject to section 41, "the legislature of
each province may exclusively make law amending" it. Section 45, of course,
establishes a distinct amending procedure in its own right, and it will be conven-
ient to treat it as such. Suffice it for the moment to say that the "constitution of
the province," roughly speaking, is the body of law governing the provinces' execu-
tive and legislative institutions.
Are the phrases "Constitution of Canada" and "constitution of the province"
mutually exclusive? Arguably, they are not. In my view, the constitution of every
province is part of the "Constitution of Canada" as that phrase appears in Part V
of the 1982 Act. The heading of Part V, which embraces section 45, is indeed
"Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada." And there is other textual
evidence pointing in the same direction. Thus section 45 is subordinated to section
41 and section 41(c) refers to section 43-notably, to section 43(b). This appears to
imply that a constitutional provision respecting the use of the English and French
languages can, at one and the same time, be both part of the constitution of a
province and also part of the Constitution of Canada.
51. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, CON. REG. CAN., ch. 1512, R. 32(2) (1978). Under the
new Rules (supra note 45) "the cover of the intervener's factum shall be blue": Rule 39(2). Is this validly
enacted?
52. 167 Eng. Rep. 345, 346 (Adm. 1864).
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This issue is of considerable importance in determining how far the various
procedures of Part V are mutually exclusive: in particular, how far sections 38 and
45 are mutually exclusive. I shall return to this question in section X.
IV
THE AMENDING PROCEDURES AND THE PARTICIPANTS
A. The Amending Procedures
I propose to denominate the amending procedures established by Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982, as follows: (i) the "general" procedure (section 38, with
which may be read section 42); (ii) the "unanimous consent" procedure (section
41); (iii) the "special arrangements" procedure (section 43); (iv) the "unilateral
federal" procedure (section 44); and (v) the "unilateral provincial" procedure (sec-
tion 45). The first two descriptions are suggested by the marginal notes to the
statute; the others are of my own choosing.
Before proceeding to analyze each amending formula individually, I shall first
consider some attributes common to all of them.
B. The Participants
1. The Crown. The Sovereign or her representative (federally, the Governor
General of Canada and provincially, the Lieutenant Governor of the province) is a
necessary participant in all the amending procedures of Part V. The "unilateral"
procedures contemplate Acts of Parliament of Canada 53 and of the provincial leg-
islatures. 54 In each such instance royal assent, given personally by the Sovereign
or through her representative, is legally indispensable. 55 The other amending pro-
cedures of Part V, sections 38(1), 41, and 43, all require a "proclamation issued by
the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada."
In the Canadian constitutional system-at the federal level at any rate-both
supreme executive power and coordinate legislative power are vested directly in the
person of the Sovereign, 56 and are exercisable by her representative only by dele-
gation. 57 It thus appears asymmetrical, and even unseemly, for Part V to confer
upon the subordinate directly-rather than initially upon the principal-the ulti-
mate lawmaking power: the power of enactment of constitutional amendments
after the necessary consents have been secured.
53. Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (UK), Sch. B § 44.
54. Id § 45.
55. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), §§ 17, 55-57, 91 (requiring assent, expressly
or by inference, for federal legislation); id §§ 58-59, 64-65, 69-90, 88 (for provincial legislation). The same
result follows for the provinces admitted since 1867 in virtue of the enactments and other instruments
establishing them. Se a/so In re Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 A.C. 935, 944-45 (P.C.); Liquidators
of Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, 1892 A.C. 437, 444 (P.C.).
56. Se Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), §§ 9, 17, 91.
57. The Governor-General appears to derive his authority to assent to bills directly from the statute;
its exercise, however, is subject at least to the Sovereign's control by instruction, and probably to restriction
by prerogative instrument. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 55. See Scott,
Entrenchment by Executive Action: A Partial Solutnm to "Legislative Oiwerk"' 4 SUPREME COURT L. REV. 303
(1982).
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No doubt, in contemplation of law the act of the Governor General in
amending the Constitution of Canada is the act of the Sovereign. 58 Yet there are
serious questions as to whether the Sovereign could act personally; whether a federal
statute (enacted, for example, under section 45) could empower the Sovereign to
act personally; and whether the Sovereign could, as a matter of law, impose restric-
tions upon the power of her subordinate to make constitutional amendment proc-
lamations. However these problems be resolved (and even assuming the resolution
most favourable to the status and dignity of the Crown), it seems most objection-
able that the Sovereign's position should be impaired in this disrespectful way,
which was in my view quite deliberate.
Section 48 shows some concern about the proprieties in that it imposes its novel
(and unnecessary) duty upon the Queen's Privy Council for Canada to advise issu-
ance of a proclamation, and not upon the Governor General to make a proclama-
tion-an act which he is, in consequence, legally free to refuse to do. It is an
interesting question whether section 48 imposes an imperative duty-whether
upon the Council as a body or upon its members-and, if so, at whose suit it is
enforceable: "The Queen's Privy Council for Canada shall advise the Governor
General to issue a proclamation under this Part forthwith on the adoption of the
resolutions required for an amendment made by proclamation under this Part." 59
2. The Houses of the Parliament of Canada. The concurrence of the House of
Commons of Canada is an essential requirement of all the amending procedures of
Part V, save only the "unilateral provincial" procedure.
What, then, of the upper house of the federal parliament, the Senate? 60 The
Senate is, of course, in law a co-ordinate legislative body of the Parliament of
Canada.61 Indeed, its position as such cannot from now on be impaired save in
accordance with section 42(l)(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982: that is, save
through the "general" procedure of section 38(1). Accordingly, the Senate's con-
currence is obviously necessary to any exercise of the "unilateral" federal
amending power of section 44.
58. In Liquidators of Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, 1892 A.C.
437, the Privy Council held that, in the absence of express words to the contrary, the Crown must be
presumed to be a necessary party to legislation. Id at 443; see also Reference re Power of Disallowance,
1938 S.C.R. 71, 76 (Can.)("The act of a Lieutenant-Governor in assenting to a bill or in reserving a bill is
an act of the Crown by the Crown's representative just as the act of the Governor General in assenting to a
bill or reserving a bill is the act of the Crown."-per Duff, C.J.); In re Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919
A.C. 935 (P.C.).
59. Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), Sch. B § 48.
60. Senators, it will be recalled, are appointed by the federal executive government, and (if appointed
after June 1, 1965) hold office until the age of seventy-five. (Senators formerly held office for life.) Repre-
sentation is on a regional basis, with twenty-four Senators representing Ontario, twenty-four representing
Quebec, twenty-four for the Maritime Provinces (ten each for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and four
for Prince Edward Island), and twenty-four for the Western provinces (six each for Manitoba, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta). Six have been added for Newfoundland, and one each for the
Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories.
On the position of the Senate of Canada, see generally Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3
(U.K.), §§ 17-18, 21-36, 53.
61. Id §§ 17, 91.
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The Senate's role in the other amending procedures-be they "multilateral ' 62
or even in some cases "bilateral" 6 3 -has been reduced, by section 47, to a six-
month delaying power:
47. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada made by proclamation under section
38, 41, 42 or 43 may be made without a resolution of the Senate authorizing the issue of the
proclamation if, within one hundred and eighty days after the adoption by the House of
Commons of a resolution authorizing its issue, the Senate has not adopted such a resolution
and if, at any time after the expiration of that period, the House of Commons again adopts
the resolution.
(2) Any period when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved shall not be counted in com-
puting the one hundred and eighty day period referred to in subsection (1).
In the original proposal of October 2, 1980,64 the Senate was given co-ordinate
authority with the House of Commons where a referendum was to be employed;6 5
but in other cases66 the Senate was to enjoy only a ninety-day delaying power.
In the revised proposal of April 24, 1981, the Senate had full co-ordinate power
in all cases. A beleaguered federal government was in no position to press forward
to Westminster, not only against the opposition of eight provinces, but without the
concurrence of the upper house in the traditional joint address to the Queen. Co-
ordinate power for the Senate was in effect to be the price of the Senate's co-
operation.
With the federal-provincial agreement of November 5, 1981, the Senate was no
longer able, as a practical matter, to insist on retaining full co-ordinate authority
in the whole constitutional amendment process, not even (perhaps especia'y not)
where its own existence or constitution or powers were involved. On the other
hand, subsections 42(1)(b) and (c) provide the Senate with a substantial degree of
entrenchment.
3. Provtnct'a/Legislative Assembh'es. All the procedures of Part V, save only the
"unilateral federal" procedure, require the concurrence of bodies forming part of
provincial "representative" legislatures. In the case of the three new-style for-
mulae involving Governor Generals' proclamations-that is, the "general" proce-
dure of section 38, the "unanimous consent" procedure of section 41, and the
"special arrangements" procedure of section 43-the concurrence of the "legisla-
tive assembly" of one or more provinces is required. "Legislative assembly" is a
term which ought to have been defined, particularly since the provinces are free
under section 45 to have bicameral or multicameral legislatures and, indeed,
largely free to prescribe the mode of selection of members of all or any of the
bodies forming part of such legislatures. It would have been preferable to have
attempted something along these lines:
In Part V, the "legislative assembly" of a province is the only deliberative legislative
62. Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. II (U.K.), Sch. B §§ 38(1), 41.
63. See id., § 43. This assumes that § 43 does in truth create a distinct amending procedure. See infla
Pt. VII.
64. See supra note 6, § 42.
65. Id § 44, applying this rule to §§ 41(1) and 43.
66. See supra note 12, §§ 46, 47, 48 and 49.
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body or the most numerous deliberative legislative body having at least full co-ordinate
power, forming part of the provincial legislature.
Nevertheless, if the legislature includes one or more such bodies consisting only of
elected representative members, the "legislative assembly" is that body, or the most
numerous such body.
When two or more bodies qualify equally, and are equally numerous, any one may act
to propose or to consent to a constitutional amendment, and all must act to withdraw or
revoke it.
The last provincial legislative upper house disappeared from Canada on
December 31, 1968, the day on which the Legislative Council of Quebec was abol-
ished by a simple provincial statute, 67 enacted-under the authority of section 92.1
of the Act of 1867-by the Crown, the Legislative Council, and the Legislative
Assembly. All Canadian provincial legislatures are now unicameral. Their single
chambers are wholly elected; therefore, de facto, the term "legislative assembly" in
Part V of the 1982 Act offers at present no difficulty of application.
Again, the term "legislature," where it appears in section 45 of the 1982 Act
(the "unilateral provincial" amendment procedure, successor to section 92.1 of the
1867 Act) means the Sovereign, or her representative, acting with the other law-
fully-prescribed elements of the provincial lawmaking process. Apart from the
Sovereign's concurrence through royal assent, the law in every province requires,
in order that a bill may become law, only due passage by the provincial legislative
assembly. So, effectively, the term "legislature" in section 45 means, for the
present, "Crown and provincial legislative assembly."
4. The Referendum and Its Disappearance. Under the federal proposals con-
cerning constitutional amendment procedures, as they were referred to the
Supreme Court of Canada on April 24, 1981, provincial consent to constitutional
amendments could, in this scheme, be given by a majority of provincial legislative
assemblies meeting stated criteria to ensure adequate representation of all regions
(and concurrence of both Quebec and Ontario).68 But provincial consent could
alternatively be given by the Canadian electorate provided that the national refer-
67. An Act Respecting the Legislative Council, 17 Eliz. 2, ch. 9 (S. Que. 1968).
68. The essence of the federal proposals concerning constitutional amendment procedures, as those
proposals stood on April 24, 1981, and as they were referred to the Supreme Court of Canada, may be seen
in these two provisions:
46. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued
by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by
(a) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and
(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least a majority of the provinces that
includes
(i) every province that at any time before the issue of the proclamation had,
according to any previous general census, a population of at least twenty-five per
cent of the population of Canada,
(ii) two or more of the Atlantic provinces, and
(iii) two or more of the Western provinces.
(2) In this section,
"Atlantic provinces" means the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward
Island and Newfoundland;
"Western provinces" means the provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan
and Alberta.
47. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued
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endum majority included also referendum majorities in provinces whose assem-
blies' consent would have sufficed as provincial approval. (The consent of the
federal Houses would remain necessary in any event.)
By contrast, the constitutional amendment processes prescribed by Part V of
the Constitution Act, 1982, all involve action by the Sovereign, or by the Governor
General (presumably as the Sovereign's representative)-and by federal and pro-
vincial deliberative legislative bodies acting in various combinations.
Participation of the electorate directly through referendum-so prominent in
the proposal of October 2, 1980,69 and its ultimate revision of April 24, 198170-
has, in consequence of the November 5, 1981, agreement, 71 disappeared com-
pletely. This development is one of far-reaching significance.
During the course of public debate, no aspect of the federal proposal-not even
the entrenchment of a charter of rights and freedoms--drew remotely as bitter a
response from provincial authorities-from Newfoundland to Western Canada-
as did the inclusion of the referendum process. Why?
The amending formula proposed in October 1980 and that which emerged in
revised form in April 1981 both imposed stringent conditions as to the number and
the grouping of provinces whose consent would be needed to effect constitutional
amendments of various kinds. Most notably, these conditions controlled amend-
ments bearing on the distribution of legislative powers as between the federal and
provincial authorities. In particular, for a general amendment to become law, the
consent of Quebec and Ontario would have been required (each having had, at
some time, at least twenty-five percent of the population of Canada). Such a pro-
vision was an obvious euphemism for giving Quebec a veto and for conceding that
whatever Quebec has, Ontario, too, must be given.
The federal government apparently expected-and in my view, rightly
by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by a refer-
endum held throughout Canada under subsection (2) at which
(a) a majority of persons voting thereat, and
(b) a majority of persons voting thereat in each of the provinces, resolutions of the legis-
lative assemblies of which would be sufficient, together with resolutions of the Senate
and House of Commons, to authorize the issue of a proclamation under subsection
46(1).
have approved the making of the amendment.
(2) A referendum referred to in subsection (1) shall be held where directed by proclama-
tion issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada, which proclamation
may be issued where
(a) an amendment to the Constitution of Canada has been authorized under para-
graph 46(l)(a) by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons;
(b) the requirements of paragraph 46(1)(b) in respect of the proposed amendment
have not been satisfied within twelve months after the passage of the resolutions of the
Senate and House of Commons; and
(c) the issue of the proclamation has been authorized by the Governor General in
Council.
(3) A proclamation issued under subsection (2) in respect of a referendum shall provide
for the referendum to be held within two years after the expiration of the twelve month
period referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection.
69. See supra note 6, § 42.
70. See sopra note 12, § 47.
71. See supra note 13.
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expected-the electorate, even in Quebec (perhaps especially in Quebec), to be
more pliable than would be any elected provincial assembly in passing judgment
on proposals from Ottawa for constitutional amendments. This would be particu-
larly true where the balance of power within the federation was concerned. The
voters would more readily give the consent of the province than would their pro-
vincial representatives.
After all, the Quebec electorate had, in the May 20, 1980, provincial refer-
endum, refused the Parti Qu~b~cois provincial government its desired mandate to
negotiate the independence of Quebec. Yet, on April 13, 1981, the same voters
returned the same government to power, no less committed to its purpose of inde-
pendence. This was a recent, and clear, demonstration of the way in which the
Quebec electorate, speaking directly, could be expected to be more attached to,
and sympathetic to, federal institutions than would a provincial legislature. But
such a phenomenon would not be confined to Quebec alone. In any province,
provincial legislators would probably cling to provincial jurisdiction with greater
tenacity than would their electorate.
A difference in attitudes, flowing from their different positions, may naturally
be expected between provincial voters and provincial representatives. But beyond
this, the electoral system in itself may play an important psychological role in pro-
vincial legislators' attitudes toward constitutional amendments.
In Quebec that phenomenon can be expected to work in the following way. Of
provincial political parties, the "more nationalist" party or parties will oppose
"centralization" on principle. The "less nationalist" party or parties will oppose
"centralization" out of fear that their opponents will effectively exploit the
"national" or "provincial autonomy" issue. Moreover, elections often turn on
"swing" votes: certain positions endanger marginal votes. Furthermore, non-
French-Canadian voters-far more likely statistically to have a "federalist" polit-
ical orientation-do not find the effect of their votes diluted in referenda; whilst,
given their geographical concentration, their votes are greatly diluted in elections
to the provincial legislature. All this points to referenda as being more favourable
to federal interests than are provincial legislative assemblies.
Although Mr. Trudeau and his colleagues may not have worked the theory out
quite so fully as this, they clearly perceived that: (1) at least in the Canadian
political context, a referendum, inserted in the amending formula as an alternative
means of securing the necessary provincial consents, would be an element of
flexibility; (2) the more rigid the amending formula in other respects, the more
this element of flexibility was needed; and (3) the flexibility derived from a refer-
endum would be favourable to federal interests, particularly as no referendum
could be held without the consent of the Senate and House of Commons of
Canada.72
The provincial premiers and the federal opposition leader grasped the implica-
72. The October 2, 1980 scheme marked the first appearance of the referendum in the text of a
proposed amending formula. This author suggested something similar in September 1964. Wishing to
alleviate the rigours of the proposed "Fulton-Favreau Formula" (requiring unanimous provincial consent
for most important constitutional amendments), this author advanced the idea that, in any amending
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tions of the referendum element from the start. Of the eight premiers who
opposed the October 1980 package, virtually all made a special point of attacking
the referendum specifically, or of attacking the package generally with the refer-
endum obviously in mind. The language was sometimes envenomed, and the
complaint was that the referendum was "centralizing." It was indeed more "cen-
tralizing" than a formula without it. Provincial autonomy was not safe in the
hands of provincial electors-at any rate, it was much less safe than in the
premiers' own hands. Whatever in Mr. Trudeau's proposals might by any possi-
bility have survived the Supreme Court's decision of September 28, 1981, the refer-
endum could never have done so. In fact, it did not.
C. Initiation of Amending Procedures
All the amending procedures may be "initiated" by any of the participating
legislative chambers. The "unilateral" procedures-assuming bicameralism or
multicameralism-will of course be subject to the normal rule that bills may be
introduced in any of two or more co-ordinate legislative bodies. For the other pro-
cedures of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, section 46(1) makes it explicit that
"[t]he procedures for amendment under sections 38, 41, 42 and 43 may be initiated
either by the Senate or the House of Commons or by the legislative assembly of a
province."
The power of a provincial legislative assembly to "initiate" constitutional
amendments by resolution seems far more likely to be effective than the power,
given to an American state legislature by Article V of the United States Constitu-
tion, to apply for the calling of a convention, even though the constitutional lan-
guage seems to impose a duty upon Congress to comply with such a request from
the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. Of course, the Canadian federal Houses
can ignore provincial resolutions-just as the provincial assemblies can ignore
those coming from Ottawa. But, as a matter of comity, the formal proposal of an
amendment by a resolution enjoying legal status seems to command the attention
of the other participants, and to demand at least due consideration. It will be
interesting to see whether the federal government will feel obliged to provide par-
liamentary time to debate resolutions coming from provincial assemblies.
D. Revocation of Resolutions of Assent
Section 46(2) of the 1982 Act settles in the affirmative the question-which
otherwise would sooner or later have had to be litigated-whether resolutions of
assent to amendments are revocable before the making of the amendment. That
section provides that "[a) resolution of assent made for the purposes of this Part
may be revoked at any time before the issue of a proclamation authorized by it.''73
formula, 'rovinwial consent should be capable of being given alternatively by the voters of the province
." See Editor's Diary, 12 McGILL L.J. 337, 342-43 note (1966-67).
Nothing came of the suggestion. In this century, the federal Liberal Party has been rather effective in
getting, and keeping, federal power in Canada. It is astounding to see how slow it has been to grasp an
idea at once so likely to advance federal interests and so very obvious.
73. Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. II (U.K.), Sch. B § 46(2).
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THE "GENERAL" PROCEDURE
The marginal note to section 38 of the 1982 Act suggests that this formula be
styled the "general procedure" for amending the Constitution of Canada:
38. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation
issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by
(a) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons: and
(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces
that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent
of the population of all the provinces.
(2) An amendment made under subsection (1) that derogates from the legislative
powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or govern-
ment of a province shall require a resolution supported by a majority of the members of
each of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies required under
subsection (1).
(3) An amendment referred to in subsection (2) shall not have effect in a province the
legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution supported by a
majority of its members prior to the issue of the proclamation to which the amendment
relates unless that legislative assembly, subsequently, by resolution supported by a majority
of its members, revokes its dissent and authorizes the amendment.
(4) A resolution of dissent made for the purposes of subsection (3) may be revoked at
any time before or after the issue of the proclamation to which it relates.
A. Necessary Number of Consenting Provincial Assemblies.
An amendment under section 38 requires the consent of two-thirds of the prov-
inces' legislative assemblies. For the moment, that means seven. This at leastfor-
ra/ly explains the apparent (implied) abrogation 4 of Parliament's pre-existing
unilateral legislative power to create new provinces.7 - This power could conceiv-
ably have been employed to create additional provinces precisely in order to facili-
tate passage of constitutional amendments under the new procedure. (American
history seems to offer at least one close precedent.7 6 ) Even so, the provisions of
section 38(2) would surely have given adequate protection to most of the basic
provincial interests. It is a fair guess that the Trudeau government did not resist
curtailment of federal legislative power to create new provinces because the federal
authorities could henceforth more easily resist pressure for the creation 6f new
provinces in the north. The resources of the north are thus more likely to remain a
"national" asset with a bigger share remaining for the existing provinces.
74. See Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. II (U.K.), Sch. B §§ 42(1)(0, 42(2).
75. See Constitution Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 28 (U.K.), § 2.
76. The state of West Virginia appears to have been created by Congress to further the cause of
suppressing the Confederate rebellion against the United States. See, e.g., A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 634-38 (1935). A rump government of "Virginia" at Wheeling
was recognized as giving the consent of Virginia to the cession of the territory from which Congress erected
the new state of West Virginia in the summer of 1863.
The thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution was proposed by Congress on January 31, 1865.
West Virginia, the sixth state to ratify, did so three days later, on February 3, 1865, and it was recognized
as one of the twenty-seven ratifying states when ratification was complete on December 6, 1865. In itself,
this does not prove that West Virginia was erected specifically to ratify the thirteenth amendment. But it
seems that West Virginia was erected to co-operate, and did co-operate, with Congressional purposes as
regards the Confederacy.
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B. Required Character of Consenting Provincial Assemblies.
Since by its terms the provinces whose assemblies' consent is needed for an
amendment must include "provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the
then latest general census, at least fifty percent of the population of all the prov-
inces," population statistics are needed to ascertain compliance with section 38.
The 1976 and 1981 Census figures are these:77
TABLE 1
POPULATION OF CANADA BY PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES
PROVINCE OR TERRITORY 1976 Census 1981 Census
Alberta 1,838,037 2,237,724
British Columbia 2,466,608 2,744,467
Manitoba 1,021,506 1,026,241
New Brunswick 677,250 696,403
Newfoundland 557,725 567,681
Nova Scotia 828,571 847,442
Ontario 8,264,465 8,625,107
Prince Edward Island 118,229 122,506
Quebec 6,234,445 6,438,403
Saskatchewan 921,323 968,313
Yukon Territory 21,836 23,153
Northwest Territories 42,609 45,741
22,992,604 24,343,181
[Provinces only 22,928,159 24,274,287]
C. Treatment of Provinces on a Uniform Basis.
The rules governing the number and character of the provinces whose assem-
blies' consent is needed for an amendment under section 38 can be said, with a
plausibility formerly impossible, to put all provinces on an "equal" footing or to
apply "fair" or "uniform" criteria. The veto power sought to be conferred upon
Quebec and Ontario 78 has been eliminated. It had formerly been accepted that a
"veto" could not be refused to Quebec and that whatever Quebec had, Ontario,
too, must be given. Needless to say, this was increasingly resisted in western
Canada, where some of the provinces began to assert a claim to the like veto. In
the end, the power of "dissent" replaced the veto.
D. Majorities Required to Pass Resolutions Derogating from "the legislative
powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the
legislature or government of a province."
Section 38(2) requires that the resolutions which it contemplates be passed by
"a majority of the members of" each of the Senate, the House of Commons, and
the legislative assemblies required under subsection (1). It is notable that no sim-
ilar express condition is to be found in subsection (1) which speaks only of "resolu-
77. For the 1976 figures, see 1981 CANADIAN ALMANAC & DIRECTORY 955 (1981). The 1981 Figures
have been informally furnished by Statistics Canada, a federal government agency.
78. See, e.g., supra note 68.
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tions of the legislative assemblies . . . ." As a matter of historical fact, it appears
that no difference was in truth intended by the federal parliamentary draftsman,
but that provincial legal advisers would not agree to the elimination of the extra
phrase.
Of course, a majority of some sort is obviously needed to carry any resolution,
even one under section 38(1). Normally a statutory quorum will be required, 79
and the question will then be decided by a majority of persons present and
voting.8 0 In the Senate of Canada, the Speaker has an original vote, but no casting
vote;" ' elsewhere, he usually has a casting vote to be exercised on equal division
only.8 2 The addition of the extra words "a majority of the members of" involves a
prima facie presumption that they are not superfluous, and that they produce a
different legal result from that which obtains where (as in section 38(1)) they are
not used. If this principle of statutory construction is applied, the question is:
what is the special or additional requirement which they add? The only obvious
explanation can be that a majority of the whole membership of the house is needed to
pass resolutions derogating from provincial powers. It remains an open question
as to how vacancies are to be taken into account.
The rule of statutory construction is not an inflexible one, and it may be that
the courts will decline to construe section 38(2) as creating a class of resolutions
which require special majorities of the entire membership of the body. Indeed,
uniformity could also be achieved (though justified only with difficulty) by a judi-
cial construction imposing the more stringent, rather than the less stringent, rule in
all cases.
Those who may wish to embark on the process of constitutional amendment
would do well to secure a judicial clarification at the earliest opportunity. Other-
wise lengthy legislative efforts may prove abortive. Indeed, one of the serious prac-
tical embarrassments which would result from distinguishing the majority
normally required by section 38(1) from the majority specially required by section
38(2) is that the sponsor would be forced from the outset of any journey of amend-
ment, either to secure the special majority in ever case, or to judge correctly
whether the proposed amendment falls outside the requirements of section 38(2) so
that the lesser, "normal" majority suffices. If there are two rules and two kinds of
majority, one can readily envisage how perplexed parliamentary officers and legal
advisers will be when they are faced with a resolution which has been "passed" by
the normal majority only, and they must decide what to do next.
E. "Dissent" as a Substitute for Veto.
Subsections 38(3) and (4) of the Constitution Act, 1982, create and regulate a
79. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), §§ 35, 48, (Houses of Parliament); id
§§ 87-86 (provincial legislatures). Quorum requirements are also to be found in instruments creating the
several provinces and in the provincial statutes.
80. See id, §§ 36, 49, 87-88. Instruments creating the individual provinces and provincial statutes also
contain such requirements.
81. Id. § 36.
82. Id §§ 49, 87-88.
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mechanism whereby the legislative assembly of a province can "dissent" from a
proposed amendment "that derogates from the legislative powers, the proprietary
rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a prov-
ince" (and can later revoke its "dissent"). Outright veto of constitutional amend-
ments has instead become veto of their application to a particular province. The
outright veto had been conceded-at least where provincial rights and powers
were to be impaired-to all provinces in the Fulton Formula8 3 and the Fulton-
Favreau Formula8 4 of the sixties. The veto had been effectively limited to Quebec
and Ontario in later proposals.8 5
The implications of this substitution were summarized in Mr. Trudeau's
phrase "chequerboard Canada." He opposed and resisted it strongly. Although
the provision for dissent allows either geographically-selective centralization or
decentralization, we shall probably see the former. Were past historical attitudes
to be projected into the future, federal jurisdiction would tend to expand with
respect to provinces other than Quebec. A "special status" for Quebec could
emerge. In Quebec, even amongst French-Canadian nationalists, there seems to
be some uncertainty as to whether this would be a good thing. Would it, for
example, underscore the necessity, desirability, or feasibility of Quebec
independence?
It should be noted that the problem, discussed above, as to the meaning of the
phrase "resolution supported by a majority of" members, recurs in respect of the
passage8 6 or revocation8 7 of a provincial assembly's resolution of dissent. While
provincial representatives in Winnipeg in March 1981 had worked out a formula
requiring a two-thirds majority of a provincial assembly to carry a resolution of
dissent, the eight premiers-apparently after late-night negotiations-reduced this
in their April 16, 1981, Ottawa proposal" to "a majority of the Members." The
moving force, it appears, was Premier Ren6 Lvesque of Quebec, who, in the April
13, 1981, provincial general election-three days earlier-had been returned to
power with eighty of the one hundred and twenty-two seats in the Quebec
"National Assembly"-two seats short of a two-thirds majority.
F. Compensation to Dissenting Provinces.
Outright veto of a constitutional proposal to transfer a matter from provincial
to federal jurisdiction would, ex hypothesi, prevent the constitutional change from
83. Reprinted in 12 McGILL L.J. 576 (1966-67).
84. Reprinted in 12 McGILL L.J. 579 (1966-67).
85. This was accomplished through the euphemism of giving a veto to every province "that at any
time before" the "issue" of a proclamation of amendment "had, according to any previous general census,
a population of at least twenty-five percent of the population of Canada": Art. 49, CANADIAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHARTER, being a draft produced by the Constitutional Conference at Victoria, B.C., June 14-16,
1971, reproduced as Appendix B to the FINAL REPORT of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of
the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (Ottawa, 1972) at 106. See provisions to the same
effect in the drafts of October 2, 1980 (upra note 6), §§ 41(1)(b)(i) and 42(1)(b); and April 24, 1981 (supra
note 12), §§ 46(1)(b)(i) and 47(1)(b).
86. Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), Sch. B § 39(3).
87. Id subsections 39(3), (4).
88. See CANADIAN NEWS FACTS, Vol. 16, No. 7, at 2490-91, and No. 8, at 2498 (1981).
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occurring at all. "Dissent," on the contrary, is simply an "opting-out," and given
the existence of the present ten provinces, up to three can do so without blocking
passage of the amendment. For these "dissenting" provinces there are obvious
fiscal consequences, since they will continue to support expenditures which the
participating provinces will have transferred to the federation. Section 40 of the
1982 Act serves to minimize such consequences by providing, "Where an amend-
ment is made under subsection 38(1) that transfers provincial legislative powers
relating to education or other cultural matters from provincial legislatures to Par-
liament, Canada shall provide reasonable compensation to any province to which
the amendment does not apply." Section 40 is restricted in scope, covering only
"education or other cultural matters." This restriction is a principal point of objec-
tion by the Quebec government.
Section 40 suggests the following questions. First, what is a "transfer"? Does
creation of a concurrent federal power suffice to bring section 40 into operation?
Second, what are "cultural" matters? (This genus includes "education" with
"other cultural matters.") Third, what, for that matter, is "education"? (Formal
instruction only?) Fourth, is there a continuing obligation, subject to reassessment
from time to time? Fifth, how far is the reasonableness of the compensation judi-
cially reviewable? Finally, does section 40 create a statutory obligation enforceable
by law?
G. Minimum and Maximum Time Period for the Operation of the "General"
Procedure.
Section 39 reads as follows:
39. (1) A proclamation shall not be issued under subsection 38(1) before the expiration of
one year from the adoption of the resolution initiating the amendment procedure there-
under, unless the legislative assembly of each province has previously adopted a resolution
of assent or dissent.
(2) A proclamation shall not be issued under subsection 38(1) after the expiration of
three years from the adoption of the resolution initiating the amendment procedure
thereunder.
In effect section 39(2) imposes a maximum time period of three years. (Quaere
whether one of the federal or provincial houses can "re-initiate" an already-
pending proposal before the expiry of the three years.) On the other hand, section
39(1) is clearly designed to give each provincial assembly reasonable leisure to
decide whether or not to dissent, and reasonable opportunity, if it so chooses, to
dissent under section 38(3) before a proclamation is made under section 38(l)-for
dissent is ony possible, under section 38(3), "prior to the issue of the proclamation
to which the amendment relates." Effectively, a minimum deliberative period of a
year is available to each assembly in which it can act one way or the other. If so
much as one province's assembly declines, or fails, to act either way, the amending
process can be delayed for the full year. This may become serious in cases of
urgency. Indeed, the power to delay, when others are anxious to move forward,
can itself be used in bargaining.
[Vol. 45: No. 4
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H. Special Matters Reserved Exclusively to the "General" Procedure.
"An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to" a series of
important matters can, under section 42(1), be made only under section 38(1).
Under section 42(2), the power of dissent does not apply in such cases. Thus sec-
tion 42(1) does not create a distinct amending procedure. It specifies cases where
subsection 38(1) applies and excludes the application of subsections 38(2), (3) and
(4). In a sense it creates a variant of the general procedure. It should be noted,
however, that sections 46(1) and 47(1) do speak of section 4289 as creating a dis-
tinct procedure in its own right.
Although the effect of section 42(1) is essentially straightforward, it does give
rise to some intricate problems, such as the meaning of the phrase "the territories"
in section 42(1)(e). For example, if it were sought to extend all or some provinces'
boundaries seaward, the proper application, respectively, of section 42(l)(e) and
section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and of section 3 of the Constitution Act,
1871, 90 would pose difficult questions.
VI
THE "UNANIMOUS CONSENT" PROCEDURE
Section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, reads as follows:
41. An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters
may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of
Canada only where authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of
the legislative assembly of each province:
(a) the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of a
province;
(b) the right of a province to a number of members in the House of Commons not less
than the number of Senators by which the province is entitled to be represented at the time
this Part comes into force;
(c) subject to section 43, the use of the English or the French language;
(d) the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada; and
(e) an amendment to this Part.
It should be noted that section 41(e) imposes the requirement of using the "unani-
mous consent" procedure for any amendment to the provisions of Part V itself.
Although generally straightforward, section 41 seems bound to give rise to
some important problems. First, the effect of section 41(d) (along with that of
section 42(1)(d)) on Parliament's legislative authority over the Supreme Court of
89. 42. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters
may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1):
) the principle of proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of
mmons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada;
(b) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators;
(c) the number of members by which a province is entitled to be represented in the
Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators;
(d) subject to paragraph 41(d), the Supreme Court of Canada;
(e) the extension of existing provinces into the territories; and
(0 notwithstanding any other law or practice, the establishment of new provinces.
(2) Subsections 38(2) to (4) do not apply in respect of amendments in relation to matters
referred to in subsection (1).
90. See supra note 29 & accompanying text.
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Canada has already been noted.9 1 Second, it is less than clear just how much of
the law relating to the Crown is covered by section 41 (a): that is, what is meant by
the "office" of the Sovereign and those of her representatives.
VII
THE "SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS" PROCEDURE
Section 4392 appears to be the Rubik's Cube of the Constitution Act, 1982, and
in this instance no booklet is available to offer quick solutions. Although it was
doubtless drafted as an independent procedure in its own right-and is referred to
as such in sections 46(1) and 47(l)-it is possible to treat it as simply attaching a
condition upon the exercise of section 38, and requiring the consent of affected
provinces in certain cases. So read, section 43 could arguably be said to serve the
purpose of avoiding the anomaly which would seem to arise in some cases from the
application of section 42. For example, an amalgamation of Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island into a new province might otherwise be
possible through section 38(1) (read with section 42(l)(d), which carries a non
obstante clause), without these provinces being able to "dissent. '9 3 Notwithstand-
ing the appeal of reading section 43 to obviate such anomalies, it is probably, on
balance, an independent amending procedure. If so, it is the least satisfactory of
those enumerated in Part V.
It is a condition for the application of section 43 that the provision being sub-
jected to amendment must be one "that applies to one or more but not all, prov-
inces." However, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the amendment itself
will have such a restricted application. On the other hand, so long as one chooses,
as the formal object of one's amendment, an existing constitutional provision-any
existing provision-"that applies to one or more but not all provinces," there is
nothing in the language of section 43 to require that the amendment tself be in
any way germane to the subject matter of the provision being amended. Unless,
therefore, the scope of section 43 is confined by judicial construction, the results
could be perfectly bizarre. Almost any sort of special constitutional arrangement
could be made with the concurrence of the federal authorities and those of the one
or more provinces to which it would apply.
The language of section 43 also raises a more immediate question: By what
legal means within the Constitution of Canada could Quebec be established as a
sovereign independent state?
91. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
92. 43. An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to
one or more, but not all, provinces, including (a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces,
and (b) any amendment to any provision that relates to the use of the English or the French lan-
guage within a province, may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the
Great Seal of Canada only where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons
and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.
Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), Sch. B.
93. Set id § 42(2),
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THE "UNILATERAL FEDERAL" PROCEDURE
The Constitution Act, 1982, integrates directly into the scheme of Part V what
may be called "unilateral federal" and "unilateral provincial" amending proce-
dures.94 Section 44 of the 1982 Act provides: "Subject to sections 41 and 42, Par-
liament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in
relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Com-
mons." Section 44 gives no power to alter the federal lawmaking process, as
defined in the 1867 Act by section 17 and the opening words of section 91, through
the subtracion of any of its elements. Nor does it appear to afford power to add
further elements-be they other actors or other formalities-as conditions of valid
legislation. Section 44 appears to allow unilateral federal statutory amendments to
the existing individual elements of the federal parliament-the Crown, the Senate,
and the House of Commons-whose continued existence section 44 presupposes;
even this power is subject to severe restrictions. 95
The Canadian Bill of Rights96 -which, it seems, is to be allowed to stand on
the federal statute book--enumerates various fundamental rights and freedoms,
and provides that:
. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of
Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed
and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridg-
ment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared.
9 7
94. The "unilateral federal" procedure of section 45 is the recognizable successor to section 91.1 of the
amended 1867 Act (since 1949 the first item in the list of legislative powers of the Parliament of Canada):
The amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada, except as regards matters coming
within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as
regards rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured to the Legisla-
ture or the Government of a province, or to any class of persons with respect to schools or as regards
the use of the English or the French language or as regards the requirements that there shall be a
session of the Parliament of Canada at least once each year, and that no House of Commons shall
continue for more than five years from the day of the return of the Writs for choosing the House:
Provided, however, that a House of Commons may in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or
insurrection be continued by the Parliament of Canada if such continuation is not opposed by the
votes of more than one-third of the members of such House.
British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 91.1 (as amended by British North America
(No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.)). This earlier provision has been repealed and replaced
by Section 44 of the 1982 Act. The language of section 44 creating the unilateral federal procedure is
framed in terms distinctly narrower than those of its predecessor, section 91.1 of the amended 1867 Act.
However, in view of the highly restrictive construction placed upon the latter by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Senate Reference, the difference may not be very large in terms of actual legal results.
Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R.3d I (Can.
1979). The court held: (1) that section 91.1 of the 1867 Act did not enable the Parliament of Canada to
abolish the Senate or alter its essential characteristics, id. at 18; (2) that "Canada" in section 91.1 referred
to the "juristic federal unit" rather than to the country generally (thus rendering nugatory some enumer-
ated exceptions to the section), id at 12; and (3) that the federal parliamentary structure, at least in its
essential respects, was also excepted by implication, id at 13. In my view, the soundness of the Court's
opinion is more than doubtful. For the most part, the difficulties created by the Senate Reference will disap-
pear under the new constitutional regime.
95. See Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. 11 (U.K.), Sch. B §§ 41-42.
96. Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 8 & 9 Eliz.
2, 1960 CAN. STAT. ch. 44, Part I.
97. Id § 2.
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Only federal laws, of course, are affected, 98 and in the absence of the required non
obstanle clause, a "law of Canada" which conflicts with the Canadian Bill of Rights
is inoperative to that extent. 99 In effect, the Canadian Bill of Rights has been read
as a statute providing a guarantee that some or all provisions of any given federal
Act, even though the bill has been duly passed by the Senate and Commons of
Canada and assented to in the Queen's name, cannot operate as law without the
additional formality of a non obstante clause. 10 0
It is not easy to bring such a guarantee within the power conferred by section
44 of the Constitution Act, 1982. On the other hand, would the guarantee, if valid
and in force before April 17, 1982, not continue until competently repealed? If
such is the case, how could the guarantee competently be repealed?
Ix
THE "UNILATERAL PROVINCIAL" PROCEDURE
The unilateral provincial procedure of section 45 of the 1982 Act is framed in
terms much wider than those of section 44: "Subject to section 41, the legislature
of each province may exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the
province."10 1
The exclusion from the provincial amending power of the office of the
Queen-even so far as it may be considered part of the provincial constitutidn-is,
under the terms of section 41(a), no longer left to inference from the exclusion of
the office of her representative, the Lieutenant Governor. Furthermore, in view of
section 41(c), a constitutional guarantee of language use 10 2 can be treated as
forming part of the relevant provincial constitution without involving the conse-
quence that it is unilaterally amendable by the provincial legislature. It is no
longer necessary to the entrenchment of the provision that it be held to be part of
the general constitution of the country as opposed to part of the constitution of the
province.' 0 3 That expedient may, however, be necessary to rationalize entrench-
ment of the new Charter as it concerns subjects of provincial jurisdiction.
98. Section 5(2) of the same Act provides:
The expression of "Law of Canada" in Part I means an Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted
before or after the coming into force of this Act, any order, rule or regulation thereunder, and any law
in force in Canada or in any part of Canada at the commencement of this Act that is subject to be
repealed, abolished, or altered by the Parliament of Canada.
Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, 1960
CAN. STAT. ch. 44, § 5(2).
99. See Regina v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R.3d 473, 482 (Can. 1969).
100. Such a guarantee was, arguably, within federal legislative power under the terms of section 91.1
of the amended 1867 Act, though it is hard to see how this can be reconciled with the restrictive construc-
tion given to section 91.1 in the Senate Reference. See supra note 94, for discussion of Senate Reference.
101. The "unilateral provincial" procedure of section 45 is the recognizable successor to section 92.1
of the 1867 Act, although there are some points of difference:
92. in each Province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to Matters coming
within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-
1. The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the
Constitution of the Province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant Governor ....
102. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), § 133.
103. See Attorney-Gen. of Quebec v. Blaikie, 101 D.L.R.3d 394, 401 (Can. 1979); Attorney-Gen. of
Manitoba v. Forest, 101 D.L.R.3d 385, 388-89 (Can. 1979).
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Section 45, in terms and by authority, 1°4 confers a general power to deal with
the constitution and organization of provincial institutions-legislative, executive,
or other-subject to the position of the Sovereign and her representative, the Lieu-
tenant Governor, protected by section 41(a). Grammatically, at any rate, section
45 is wide enough to permit the provincial legislative institutions, however they
may be lawfully constituted at any time, to reconstitute those very institutions
with the utmost freedom. The old issue affecting its predecessor, section 92. -
that is, whether any implied limitations circumscribe that freedom-seems to con-
tinue.105 The question arises, for example, whether a referendum can lawfully be
established as an alternative--or even as a substitute '°0-lawmaking authority along-
side, or in place, of the provincial representative legislature, or whether the refer-
endum can be imposed as a superadded condition necessary for the valid
enactment of all legislation, or of legislation of some defined classes. 10 7 Another
such question is whether--so long as the law presently in force is carefully
respected-additional houses can be added to the representative legislature or spe-
cial majorities can be required in the legislative houses or, for that matter, in the
referenda.
X
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG AMENDING PROCEDURES
A principal question raised by Part V is how far the various procedures which
it creates are mutually exclusive. Despite the appearance of the word "only" in
section 43, and the word "exclusively" in sections 44 and 45, these sections, it is
submitted, ought not to be read so as to make them exclusive of section 38.
104. Cf Attorney-Gen. of Quebec v. Blaikie, 101 D.L.R.3d at 400 (construing § 92.1 of the Act of
1867).
105. The Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 ch. II (U.K.), Sch. B, through its section 53(1) and Schedule
Item 17, effects the repeal of section 7(1) of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (U.K.). This
may affect the continuing applicability of section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict.,
ch. 63 (U.K.), to the extent (if any) that the aforesaid section 7(1) had otherwise preserved its operation
where amendments to the British North America Acts were concerned.
Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, which in terms grants power to representative colo-
nial legislatures to amend the colonial constitution in certain respects, was one of the constitutional bases
for colonial legislation on "manner and form" of lawmaking. See bi:fa note 107.
106. See In re Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 A.C. 935 (P.C.),ati'ming Re Initiative and Refer-
endum Act, 32 D.L.R. 148 (Man. 1916). There, the Privy Council, strictly speaking, left this question
open. The Council construed the provincial referendum scheme (in my view, magi' ulpereal quam valeal) as
dispensing with the Lieutenant Governor's participation, and so struck the scheme down as violative of
section 92.1 of the British North America-Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.).
The broader reasons of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the decision below--taking a generally restric-
tive view of section 92.1 and apparently barring a referendum as a substituted legislative process, 32 D.L.R.
at 153, have recently been cited (without express approval or disapproval) by the Supreme Court of
Canada. Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R.3d 1,
14 (Can. 1979).
See generally Scott, Constituent Authonry and the Canadian Provinces, 12 McGILL L.J. 528 (1966-67).
107. See generally Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Trethowan, 1932 A.C. 526 (P.C.), affiming
Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Trethowan, 44 C.L.R. 394 (Austl. 1931), affmng Trethowan v.
Peden, 31 N.S.W. St. R. 183 (S. Ct. N.S.W. 1930).
The Privy Council's decision turned essentially on the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict.,
ch. 63 (U.K.), § 5, and thus may be of marginal value in Canada today. See supra note 105. The decisions
of the Australian courts, however, are based on much wider grounds.
RESHAPING CONFEDERATION
Mutual exclusivity inter se of the various procedures of Part V, where it does not
result from the very nature of the provision (as it does in the case of section 41), is
of mischievous consequence, and should be avoided so far as possible.
It is important that, to the extent that the terms of two or more provisions
overlap, they be read as concurrent pro tanto. In particular, as between more com-
prehensive provisions (such as section 38) and less comprehensive ones (such as
section 43), it appears desirable that they be read whenever possible as standing in
a hierarchy, so that the former stands to the latter as the "more difficult" to the
"less difficult." Compliance with the former would be ipso facto compliance with
the latter. Otherwise it may prove impossible to include, in a single proposed
amendment and as a single package, a single provision having effects upon dif-
ferent parts of the constitution.
Both of the "unilateral" amending procedures, sections 44 and 45, purport, in
terms, to confer "exclusive" powers. But "exclusive" of what? That the powers
conferred by sections 44 and 45 are, in principle, "exclusive" of one another is
certain. It is no less certain that each of these two powers is, in principle, equally
exclusive of allpowers, however arising, belonging to the other level of government.
Moreover, the powers of each province are, of course, exclusive of those of any
other province.
In my view, however, sections 44 and 45 ought not to be held to be in any sense
exclusive of the other amending procedures of Part V. It would be of mischievous
consequence for an amendment, merely because it has an impact upon the federal
executive government, or the Senate, or the House of Commons, to be invalid as
an encroachment upon the "exclusive" powers of section 44, even though the
amendment has duly complied with the requirements of another prima facie
appropriate procedure-for example, section 38. (Indeed, section 41 requires the
"unanimous consent" procedure to be employed; and section 42 requires the "gen-
eral" procedure to be employed, for certain amendments dealing with federal
institutions.)
Moreover, the internal provincial constitutions ought properly to be regarded
as part of the "Constitution of Canada" as that term appears in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982.108 If so, the various "bilateral" and "multilateral" proce-
dures of Part V are not excluded from effecting amendments to matters contem-
plated by section 45. This can be inferred from section 41 (e), which allows section
45 itself to be amended by the "unanimous consent" procedure. The unanimous
consent procedure can thus be used first to amend section 45, and then to alter the
provincial constitution. If so, it should be possible to compress the two stages into
one, and to amend a provincial constitution directly through the use of section
41.109 While this is not of great practical consequence--since the concurrence of
the provincial assembly is required in any event-it does point to the conclusions
that provincial constitutions are part of the "Constitution of Canada," and that
Part V procedures other than section 45-notably section 38--can be used to
108. See supra Pt. III.
109. McCawley v. The King, 1920 A.C. 691 (P.C.).
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amend them. Of course, the power of "dissent" furnished by section 38(3) would
be available in such cases.
If Article V of'the United States Constitution had come before a meeting of
Canadian federal and provincial legal advisers, a provincial representative would
immediately have insisted upon the addition, at the end of the Article, of some-
thing like the following words: "or of the application to such State of the benefit of
this proviso." That, I think, explains a great deal about the way in which Part V
of the Constitution Act, 1982, is drafted. Indeed, it shows, basically, how we in
Canada write and read legislation.

